Teaching COIN to ILE Students

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16 June 2010

Some Cautions

- Most officers have multiple deployments
- Tend to interpret doctrine as whatever they were just doing
- Marines are more likely to have actually read the manual before
- Many strawmen of doctrine exist in print, among critics and supporters
- Core of COIN doctrine is process more than specific guidance

Early Precedents

- 1863 - General Orders 100, the Lieber Code, used in Civil War and Philippines
- Despite experience fighting guerrillas in Mexico in 1840s, in South in 1860s and 1870s, and in the Philippines, as well as Indian wars, any Army interest in COIN-style doctrine was episodic and brief.
- Generally, Army approach was more sticks than carrots
- 1940 - USMC Small Wars Manual, product of their experience of 1920s, 1930s, gets overshadowed by WWII

The Legacy of Von Moltke

- Influenced American military reformers at end of 19th Century, shaped institutions
- Believed in strong military with sole purpose of fighting and winning major wars
- Once war began, military needed free hand; when major hostilities ended, the military had no major role
- Diplomats did reconstruction and nation-building

Cold War COIN

- Advisory Efforts – influencing balky allies
  - Greece
  - Korea
  - Thailand
  - The Philippines
- Vietnam – sparks flurry of publications, institutional commitment
  - Heavy influence from Thompson and Trinquier, move towards “hearts and minds”

US Military Legacy of Vietnam

- New Tactics and Techniques – air assault, PGMs, leadership reform, training centers
- Operational Art – new appreciation for importance of linking tactical success to strategy, Clausewitz
- Strategic Level of War – focus on what we do well (major conventional wars); avoid what we do poorly (counterinsurgency, nation-building); mistrust of media and political constraints; casualty aversion

Army Force Structure

- Creighton Abrams wanted to save division flags in postwar drawdown, give Reserve Components missions they could handle
- Placing so much CS/CSS in RC also was seen by some as way to limit President's ability to go to war without mobilization; that has become dogma since, but has not worked to limit deployments
- End result was an Army improperly structured for counterinsurgency, peace operations, and post-conflict missions

Post-Vietnam Doctrine

- Focus quickly turned to defeating Soviets in Europe
- 1973 Mideast War and NATO dominated thinking
- Active Defense, AirLand Battle continued emphasis
- Counterinsurgency files purged from Army schools
- NTC featured Soviet enemy
- In 1980s, interest in counterinsurgency returned, but used El Salvador model with minimal direct US involvement
- Capstone operations manuals cited Vietnam as example of over-involvement in COIN, did not foresee major role for conventional forces, paid little attention to subject ; neglect exacerbated by creation of SOCOM

Catalysts for Change

- Explosion of SSCs in 1990s – Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti – prepares force for change, educates junior leaders
- Iraq demonstrates need for change to whole leadership
- People are also catalysts, emerging from crucible of Iraq into key shaping positions:
  - LTG David Petraeus
  - LTG James Mattis
- New military doctrine spawned similar effort in US Interagency, in US Air Force, in NATO, and in joint doctrine (JP 3-24)

SSC Operations -- Jan 90 to Sep 00

U.S. ARMY Center for Army Analysis



- January 1990 to January 1993--increasing number of operations
- January 1993 to October 1993--transition period
- October 1993 to October 2000--number of operations fluctuates, but rate of increase stabilizes (slower rate of increase)

Ideal Vision of Transition



Realistic Vision of Transition



Changing the Way an Organization Thinks

- New scenarios at training centers
- New curriculum in military schools
- Better and accelerated Lessons Learned process
- Different unit preparation before deployments
- New doctrine

An Engine of Change

Knowledge Management

Doctrine
(Theory)

Leader Development
(Understanding)

Collective Training
(Application)



Lessons Learned
(Adjustment)

Combat/ Contingency Operations

A Learning Organization

Details of Atypical Process

- October 2004 interim COIN manual was tactical, new version operational
- Short time line to finish, less than a year, very fast for military doctrine
- Broad array of contributors from services, interagency, academia, human rights community, media, think tanks
- Army-Marine integration in true team effort
- LTG Petraeus read every word
- Intent is beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, but they shaped it

Details of New Doctrine

- Population-centric; success is achieved when people accept government as legitimate
- Some enemies still must be killed or captured, but force must be applied very carefully in “mosaic war”
- Military force cannot achieve success by itself
- Eventually the host nation must win its own war
- Intelligence gathering is more cultural anthropology than normal military intelligence
- Campaign design is required to identify problem set
- Enemies must be disaggregated, dealt with differently
- Managing information is critical; perceptions are reality, and shape victory
- Focus on clear-hold-build as dominant approach
- Learn and Adapt is dominant theme

Status of US COIN in 2005



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



Joint Doctrine
JP 1, JP 2-0, and JP 3-0



Army Capstone Doctrine
FM 1 & FM 3-0

CAMPAIGN/OPERATIONAL THEMES

- JP 3-0 — JOINT OPS DOCTRINE
- JP 5-0 — JOINT OPS PLANNING
- FM 3-23 — PEACE OPERATIONS
- FM 3-24 — COUNTER-INSURGENCY

Manual had 15 primary authors, 12 secondary, & 600,000 editors- Army & USMC.

ELEMENTS OF COMBAT POWER

- FM 6-22 — ARMY LEADERSHIP
- FM 2-0 — INTELLI-GENCE
- FM 4-0 — SUSTAIN-MENT
- FM 6-0 — COMMAND AND CONTROL
- FM 3-09 — FIRE SUPPORT
- FM 3-10 — PROTECTION

FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

- FM 3-90 — TACTICS
- FM 3-07 — STABILITY OPERATIONS
- FM 3-28 — CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

SUPPORTING DOCTRINE



REFERENCE

- FM 5-0 — THE OPERATIONS PROCESS
- FM 7-0 — TRAINING THE FORCE
- FM 1-02 — TERMS AND GRAPHICS
- FM 7-15 — AUTL

FM 3.0: Full Spectrum Operations



COIN and Full Spectrum Operations

COIN is a Campaign Theme and is a combination of Offense, Defense and Stability Tasks

Offense and defense complement or support stability.

Stability tasks will always be the decisive part of the operations.

The proportion of effort devoted to Offense, Defense, and Stability within COIN can change over time…



Deter and Initiative



Initiative and Dominate



Stabilize and enable Civil

…and can vary geographically and by echelon in a “mosaic war.”

The Continuum of Operations (UK)



The Continuum of Operations: Southern Iraq 2003 – 2004

Iraq - November 2004



MNC-I Operational Theme

Insurgency

MNC-I Type of Operation

Counterinsurgency

MNC-I

Stability

Defense | Offense

- **MNF-NW**
  - Defense | Offense
  - Stability
- **MND-NC**
  - Stability
  - Defense | Offense
- **MND-B**
  - Stability
  - Offense | Defense
- **MNF-W**
  - Offense
  - Stability | Defense
- **MND-CS**
  - Stability
  - Defense | Offense
- **MND-SE**
  - Stability
  - Defense | Offense

Iraq - November 2004

MNF-W Type of Operation
Counterinsurgency



MNF-W (I MEF)

Offense
Defense | Stability

1 MarDiv

Offense
Defense | Stability

31 RCT	24 RCT	1 RCT	7 RCT	2BCT/1CD	2BCT/2ID	11 MEU
Defense	Stability	Offense	Offense	Defense	Defense	Stability
Offense | Stability	Defense | Offense	Defense | Stability	Defense | Stability	Offense | Stability	Offense | Stability	Defense | Offense
Border Area	Babel	Fallujah	Fallujah	Fallujah	Fallujah	Karbala/Najaf

Intellectual Underpinnings

- David Galula
- Frank Kitson
- Robert Thompson
- Steve Metz
- Max Manwaring
- T.E. Lawrence
- **MG Chiarelli**
- Phillip Davidson
- Bard O'Neill
- David Kilcullen
- USMA, CGSC
- "The Field"
- USMC Irregular Warfare project
- The Marx Brothers – Lenin, Mao, Giap, Che
- Carlos Marighelia
- RAND Arroyo, IDA
- LTG Mattis
- **LTG Petraeus**
- John Nagl
- CIA, USAID, State
- Human Rights Community
- Ralph Peters

The Influence of Galula

Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population…A revolutionary war is 20 per cent military action and 80 per cent political.

--David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*

- Revolutionary war is unfair, most rules favor the insurgent
- Information operations permeate everything
- Though not ideal, military forces must be prepared to do traditionally non-military missions
- Counterinsurgents must recognize insurgency exists, deal with root causes

Historical Sources

- Philippine Insurrection
- Huk Rebellion
- First Indochina War
- Second Indochina War
- Chinese Civil War
- Nepal
- Malaya
- Indonesia
- Arab Revolt
- Colombia
- Peru
- Cuba
- El Salvador
- Ireland
- Spain
- Ivory Coast
- Algeria
- Afghanistan
- Iraq

Chapter Breakdown

- Chapter 1 – Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
- Chapter 2 – Unity of Effort: Civil-Military Integration (Put early for interagency emphasis)
- **Chapter 3 – Intelligence (Much Socio-Cultural)**
- **Chapter 4 – Designing Operations (New)**
- **Chapter 5 – Executing Operations (includes Information Operations, LLOs)**
- Chapter 6 – Developing Host Nation Forces
- Chapter 7 – Leadership and Ethics
- Chapter 8 – Sustainment(unique COIN logistics)
- Appendixes (Guide for Action, SNA and Intelligence Tools, Linguistic Support, Legal, Airpower, Reference Bibliography)

Elements of Insurgency

- Movement Leadership
- Political Cadre
- Combatants
- Auxiliaries
- Mass Base

- EACH ELEMENT MAY REQUIRE A DIFFERENT COIN APPROACH

Insurgent Approaches

- Conspiratorial
- Military-focused
- Urban
- Protracted Popular War
- Identity-focused
- JP adds Subversive approach

COUNTERINSURGENTS MAY FACE A SHIFTING COMBINATION OF APPROACHES AND NETWORKS

COIN Principles (Historically Based)

- Legitimacy (locally defined) as the main objective
- Unity of effort is essential
- Political factors are primary
- Understanding the environment
- Intelligence as the driver for operations
- Isolation of insurgents from their cause and support
- Security under the rule of law
- Long term commitment

COIN Imperatives
(From more contemporary experience)

- Manage information and expectations
- Use the appropriate level of force
- Learn and adapt
- Empower the lowest levels
- Support the host nation

COIN Paradoxes

- Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be
- Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is
- The more successful you are, the less force you can use – and the more risk you must accept
- Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction
- Some of the best weapons for COIN do not shoot
- The host nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing it well
- If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week. If it works in this province, it might not work in the next
- Tactical success guarantees nothing
- Many important decisions are not made by generals

The Process of Campaign Design



Effect of Proper Application of LLOs (or Lines of Effort)



1st MarDiv's Operational Design for OIF II



101st Div Lines of Operation IRAQ



Synergy of Lines of Effort


Coalition Funding
Satisfaction with Essential Services
Time to Develop Governance
Breakdown of Essential Services
Developing and Restoring Essential Services
Economic Investment
Expectations for Essential Services
Essential Services
Governance
Time to Develop Essential Services
Psychological Operations Effectiveness
Potential Fractiousness of Society
Economic Development
Impact of Illegitimate Actions
Support for Insurgency
Neutral Populace
Support for HN Government
Appropriate Mix of Effort and Use of Force
Available Workforce
Perceived Security
Individual Competence, Judgement, and Ability to Execute
Intelligence
External Material Support
Time to Develop HN Security Forces
Insurgent Acts of Violence
Appropriate Strategic Emphasis
Insurgent to Force Density Ratio
Total Force Density
Host Nation Security Forces
Understanding and Knowledge of Social Structures
Coalition Force Density
Host Nation Force Density
The Logical Lines of Operations

Criticisms of New Doctrine

- Wrongheaded – Only brutality works
- Misdirected – Needs to be enemy-centric
- Rightminded, but naive – US is too brutal
- Irrelevant – Civil Wars are not COIN
- Too Traditional – Old COIN thinking is out of touch with present realities
- Impossible – US social, political, and military culture cannot do COIN
- Dangerous – Will cause force to lose essential conventional skills, make leaders overconfident with too-expensive COIN
- Luddite - Neglects technology, airpower

Impacts of Field Manual

- 2 Million downloads the first month on web
- Republished by University of Chicago Press
- Lead review in New York Times, by Pulitzer Prize winner
- Besides interagency and USAF, has also influenced allies (and enemies)
- Textbook at many major universities
- Computer model of FM used to generate troop to task data for Afghanistan

The Surge(s)

- Extra troops made it easier for GEN Petraeus to conduct new COIN operations, esp. Baghdad
- Many Iraqis told me that the key impact of the surge was announcement signified American commitment to stay the course, most Anbar impact happened before troops arrived
- O'Hanlon and Pollack piece on success of surge was most important information event of 2007 (late July), resulting surge in US will
- Petraeus achieved civilian surge by assigning PRTs to BCTs

Reasons for the "Awakening"

- Iraqis were tired of violence
- Sunnis realized they could not win, must become part of the solution
- Al Qaeda was inept at insurgency
- GEN Petraeus, his vision, and the new doctrine
- Coalition adaptation to tribal dynamics and Iraqi aspirations
- The immense competence of American military forces in Iraq
- Al-Sadr's truce also helped

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Expanding Role of Brigade Commanders

COIN in Falluja

Combat Outposts and Joint Security Stations

Rise of the “Sons of Iraq”

Training the Iraq Army

Importance of Police:

National Police Deployments in Baghdad



COIN “Behind the Wire” at Bucca

New Courts and Legal Reform

MRAPs – Mixed Messages

Barriers and Movement Control

Accepting Local Solutions

Problems in Afghanistan

- No Unity of Effort, even among NATO nations, and no uniform COIN campaign, also can’t template Iraq
- Airpower was key element of Iraqi success, but it cannot substitute for shortage of boots on the ground either for gathering intelligence or perceptions of security
- Perception of excessive civilian casualties in on-call airstrikes, SOF raids – and who controls the ground controls the message. ROE perhaps too restrictive
- Significant decline in public support and government legitimacy in key areas
- The Taliban adapts better than Al Qaeda
- Pakistan remains key to region

Excessive Use of Special Ops?

DOONESBURY
BY GARRY TRUDEAU
SO, WHAT'VE YOU GOT FOR ME?
DRUG LORD. A MAJOR PLAYER.
HE'S CHALLENGING MY AUTHORITY HERE, BUT I CAN'T TOUCH HIM. HE HAS CONNECTIONS IN KABUL.
WHERE'S HE AT?
THAT GRAY HOUSE OVER THERE, JUST BEYOND THE MOSQUE.
BEEP! BEEP! BEEP!
WHOOM!
WHAT ELSE YOU GOT?
I DON'T GET IT — HOW COME YOU GUYS ARE LOSING?
UNIVERSAL PRESS SYNDICATE © 2009 G.B. Trudeau
www.doonesbury.com

Broader Institutional Worries

- Has the pendulum swung too far, or not enough, or not at all? – Reform is uneven
- The soul of SOF, and role reversal
- Semantic obfuscation
- People are not terrain
- Has FM become National Security Strategy?
- Neglect of staffs and headquarters
- Health of the all-Volunteer force and its utility in “Long War,” including tour length & rotation policies
- Continuing lack of interagency capability

QUESTIONS ???